Revolution #234, May 29, 2011
Part 2: BUILDING THE MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTION
Some Further Thoughts Relating to "On the Possibility of Revolution"
Imperialist countries
With regard to imperialist countries, it is worthwhile briefly reviewing the strategic orientation discussed in "On the Possibility of Revolution,"1 while referring people to that work itself, which presents in a very concentrated way the basic principles to which I want to speak here. The basic orientation that is upheld and emphasized in "On the Possibility of Revolution" is to maintain the understanding that in imperialist countries in particular it is only with a major, qualitative change in the situation—that is, the eruption of a revolutionary crisis and the emergence of a revolutionary people in the millions and millions—that it becomes possible to wage the all-out struggle for the seizure of power; and that when it does become possible to do that, with the qualitative change in the situation and the emergence of those conditions, in contrast to what was previously thought, this struggle should not take the form of simultaneous massive insurrections in a number of major cities but rather a more protracted struggle, which would have some features in common with—while also being different in some significant ways from—the strategic orientation applied in Third World countries where the road to revolution generally lies in a protracted people's war.
As a decisive point of orientation, it is important to emphasize that the kind of protracted struggle that is spoken of in "On the Possibility of Revolution," particularly in regard to imperialist countries, while it would have some features in common with struggles in Third World countries which are dominated, or even outright occupied, by imperialism, would also have this difference—and it's a very important one: in imperialist countries the revolutionary struggle takes place in the "home base" of the imperialists; it cannot revolve around driving out invading and occupying forces—wearing them down and causing them ultimately to withdraw—but would instead require actually defeating, disintegrating and thoroughly dismantling the forces of the imperialists, right where they are fundamentally based.
This is a profound difference and has very profound implications in terms not only of the objective, but the means for waging the struggle to achieve that objective. It is a very different phenomenon and dynamic when your objective is simply to wear down powerful occupying or invading forces and cause them to give it up and withdraw, and then to wage struggle against remaining local reactionary forces—that is very different from a situation where it is necessary to actually fight the imperialists on the "home ground" that is shared by both sides, and to defeat, disintegrate and thoroughly dismantle the reactionary forces in that situation. In other words, they're not going to give it up and withdraw in these circumstances. In terms of strategic approach, such an outcome—driving them out, forcing them to flee the country—is not one that should be counted on, not one around which the strategy of the revolutionary forces in this situation should revolve. Instead, once again, the objective would have to be squarely confronted: defeating, disintegrating and thoroughly dismantling the repressive apparatus of the old order and the reactionary forces fighting for that old order.
This also sheds light on and emphasizes another important point relating to "On the Possibility of Revolution," particularly as applied to and with its focus on imperialist countries. The necessity for protractedness in this struggle—once the conditions have been brought into being which make this struggle possible—has to do with the need to avoid decisive encounters with the other side (encounters whose outcome would have a strategic bearing on the whole course and result of the struggle) before the possibility exists for such encounters to have a positive outcome for the revolutionary forces and in relation to their fundamental revolutionary objectives. Protractedness would also be required in keeping with the necessity to avoid establishing a new, revolutionary regime prematurely, when such a regime would be highly vulnerable to devastating defeat—before the conditions are coming into being for the final defeat of the imperialist and reactionary forces.
On the other hand, such a struggle would not be, and should not be characterized by, "settling into protractedness," because that too would very likely be a recipe for defeat—for being smashed and decimated. Rather, there would be the need and the challenge of continually seeking the means to seize—to take and to regain when it's lost—the initiative. And there would be a need to conduct all this with a certain "finiteness" of orientation—even while this would be protracted, it also would have to be finite.
The phenomenon of "protractedness without any finite orientation" has been a problem even in Third World countries. In certain situations, the sense of "finiteness," in terms of the orientation of the revolutionary forces, has been lost, and the protracting of the struggle has become in essence "a thing unto itself"; if not by intention then at least in objective effect, the ultimate seizure of power, throughout the country, recedes into the background, not just as an immediate goal but in a more overall and basic sense. So, whatever the specific situation—and this would have particular application in imperialist countries—there would need to be protractedness, but not "settling into protractedness," and there would need to be the constant struggle to seize, to take—and to regain when it's lost—the initiative, and an orientation of "finiteness" at the same time as "protractedness."
There is also, very importantly, the problem of the development of the necessary political and ideological conditions for the initiation of this struggle for the seizure of power—and the organized expression of the political and ideological influence of the vanguard—among the basic masses but also, to the greatest degree possible at every point along the way, among other strata of the people as well, in order to have the best possible basis for carrying forward the struggle for power once it has been launched and not, in fact, to be contained and crushed, but to have the best possible basis to "break out of encirclement," when the necessary conditions have emerged and this all-out struggle for power has begun, in those conditions. It is important to emphasize this point: It is not just at the time that this protracted struggle would be launched and waged, when the conditions for that have come into being—it's not just at that time and in those conditions that the necessary work would need to be done to create the basis not to be encircled and suppressed in confined areas. Rather, political and ideological work with this contradiction in mind would need to be carried out during the whole period before the emergence of the necessary conditions and before such a struggle is launched. You could make an analogy to farming, to planting and harvesting: You can't try to harvest crops immediately after they have been planted, without any time for those crops to actually grow and to ripen. So work would have to be done with strategic perspective all along the way, even while the character of things would be qualitatively different once the necessary objective conditions had emerged and the all-out struggle for power were being waged.
In this connection, it is also important to continue to study historical experience involving the defeat of more or less revolutionary struggles that could be—and were in fact—confined, in terms of their mass base of support, to minority sections of the population. If a struggle of the kind being spoken of here were launched when the necessary conditions emerged, but there had not been much of a basis created previously—not only in regard to the development of the objective conditions, but in terms of political and ideological work—to spread this struggle beyond its most solid base among the population, and to have it be taken up, in various levels of activity or support, by broad strata of the population, then that would pretty much be a recipe and a trajectory for defeat. So the need would exist to lay the basis to prevent and overcome such a strategic approach by the other side, which they would very likely apply, and have applied in past experiences—seeking to isolate and then crush a revolutionary struggle of this kind.
We can think of examples in relatively recent history, such as Northern Ireland and Malaya (not long after World War 2), where generally revolutionary struggles, or struggles going up against the established power in any case, were isolated to the section of the population in which they had their strongest support and therefore were able to be cut off and, to a very significant degree, suppressed—and, in the case of Malaya, outright defeated.
These are just a couple of examples from history. There is much more to be studied and learned about from history, more recent history as well as experience in the more distant past, in regard to this basic principle: While it may be the case—and if we're talking about things in a country like the U.S. with its high degree of parasitism, it is very likely to be the case—that there will be a gap, a significant gap, between the most bedrock base for this revolutionary movement and other strata of the people, if that is allowed to be turned into a profound, unsurpassable gulf, and only that hard-core section of the population is moving in the direction of involvement in and active support for this struggle, then this struggle is on the way to defeat. This is something that has to be thought about and acted upon not only when the conditions do undergo a qualitative change, and there is an all-out struggle for power—but long before that, in terms of how political and ideological and organizational work is carried out.
There is also the necessity to squarely confront what will almost inevitably be the savage destructiveness and ruthlessness of the imperialist (and other reactionary) forces, who will spare very little in their attempts to outright crush and pulverize any attempt at bringing a new society into being through revolutionary struggle, especially right where their base of power is. We can think of examples, again, from recent history. There is the recent experience of Fallujah in Iraq and the lengths that the U.S. imperialists went to, to devastate that city and its population—bombing hospitals, massacring civilians, when most of the insurgents had actually left the city by the time of the second assault of the U.S. on the city. This was done by the U.S. imperialists to exact revenge and to "teach a lesson" to the people not only in that city, but in that country and more broadly in the world. It is not the case that the U.S. imperialists unleashed everything they could have unleashed on that city, but they did go to great lengths to inflict tremendous suffering on not just the hard-core people fighting them, but the broader population.
So, certainly in a situation in which their very power and ability to dictate and exploit throughout the world were being challenged in a frontal way, there is no question that they would unleash savage destructiveness and ruthlessness on a massive scale. Both ideologically and practically, it would be necessary to be prepared for this—and to prepare the masses for this—and for this to be turned back against them, with the determination of the people at the core of the struggle and growing numbers of the masses—not only basic masses but also people of other strata more broadly—being heightened to defeat these imperialists and reactionaries for all the crimes that they've committed right then, as well as everything they had done leading up to that. This will be a real struggle in the ideological realm and in the practical realm.
It is also worthwhile, as a kind of theoretical conceptualizing, to envision the basic character of the "opening phase" of this protracted struggle. Once again I refer people to how this is characterized in "On the Possibility of Revolution," including the following:
"A particular and distinguishing feature of the situation in which it would be possible, and correct, for the revolutionary forces to launch such a protracted struggle, would be that the repressive and reactionary violence of the existing state and its institutions would have lost its legitimacy—would have come to be seen as unjust and illegitimate violence—in the eyes of very broad sections of society. This is one of the key indicators of a revolutionary situation and key bases for the emergence of a revolutionary people."
Without elaborating at length on this here, the point is then made in "On the Possibility of Revolution" that, once the necessary qualitative change had come about, and the protracted struggle would then have the necessary objective basis, the character of the "opening phase" of this protracted struggle would need to be one which made clear by its very nature that there was now on the scene a serious revolutionary force contending actively for power, with a vision and program for radically transforming society, with the fundamental aim of uprooting relations of exploitation and oppression.
In this regard, once again seeking to draw broad lessons from historical experience, there is an interesting point in the book Guerilla Days in Ireland, A Personal Account of the Anglo-Irish War (referring to the war right after World War 1), written by Tom Barry, who actively took part in that war on the side of Irish resistance to British domination. Barry recounts how the Easter Rebellion in Ireland, during the course of World War 1—even though this rebellion was smashed and defeated by the British—had a major impact, particularly on the youth of Ireland, including Barry himself. It is very interesting that at the time this occurred, Barry was in fact serving in the British army, fighting against the German-led alliance in World War 1, and yet this rebellion was a galvanizing event for him—and, he says, for many other Irish people, particularly youth at that time—even though the rebellion failed. So there is something important to learn from this experience—even while things should not be repeated in the same form leading to the same outcome. Recasting this lesson in light of the theoretical conception set forth in "On the Possibility of Revolution"—of a protracted revolutionary struggle, once the necessary conditions emerged—and more particularly with regard to the "opening phase" of such a struggle, what stands out is the significance of making clear to people throughout society, and indeed to the world, that there is a contending force with a radically different vision of what society should be, which has announced its presence, and its seriousness in terms of fighting through to realize that vision.
Another important element that is worth calling attention to, in terms of this overall struggle, is the role of periodic mobilizations of masses, as well as other political and ideological work to continue winning over and organizing growing numbers of masses into the revolutionary struggle—not only people from the bedrock base of that struggle but broader strata as well—and to further influence the "political terrain" and carry forward further political repolarization among various strata, including the heightening of divisions within the ranks of the enemy forces, in a direction more favorable to revolution. This would be in the midst of—and in fact to make conditions increasingly more favorable for—the principal task and focal point of the struggle at that time: aiming for the seizure of power, through the decisive defeat of the forces of reaction, in line with the basic principles set forth in "On the Possibility of Revolution."
It is also important to have in mind the overall relation between the broad masses—the "millions and millions" who would make up the revolutionary people at that time, and their growing numbers—on the one hand, and on the other hand the organized revolutionary force at the core of the actual struggle for the seizure of power, not only in terms of how this relation would take shape and be expressed at the beginning but throughout this struggle, with its protracted, but still finite, character.
All this once more shines a light on, and emphasizes the importance of, work that is carried out before there is the qualitative change in the objective conditions. In particular, it highlights the role of a mass movement for revolution which would—with the development of a revolutionary situation and the growth of this movement to incorporate millions—be transformed qualitatively into a force waging and supporting the all-out struggle for power (as discussed in "On the Possibility of Revolution"). At the same time, there would be interpenetration of that with the phenomenon of "civil war between two sections of the people" (in broad terms, the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary sections, or forces, among the people overall) that would almost certainly be a major feature of such a struggle. The necessity would exist, in those future conditions, to both carry out such a battle between two sections of the people—intertwined with the struggle against the main repressive forces of the old order—and to work to achieve continuing repolarization, on more favorable terms, through the course of the overall struggle, winning over as many people as possible from the ranks of the counter-revolution to that of the revolution, or at least politically neutralizing them, so that they no longer took part in opposing the revolution. All this is another complexity that would have to be dealt with in the course of this protracted struggle.
There is also the need, in terms of further developing theoretical and strategic conception, to devote a great deal more attention to the problem of leadership. This is a question not only in a general sense, but more specifically in relation to the "decapitation" strategy of the forces of the old order. Such work, in the realm of theoretical conception, would need to focus on the importance of leadership not only on the highest, and overall strategic, level but also, very importantly, on levels below that which, along with overall strategic leadership, would be decisive in such a protracted struggle once the conditions for that had emerged. While it is not the entirety of what would need to be taken up in this regard, in those qualitatively different circumstances there would be an important application of the principle of ideological centralization and organizational decentralization.
A problem which is already posing itself rather acutely—and which will have force throughout the course of the period before, and then in an accentuated way in the course of, the protracted struggle for power—is the one-sided nature of the alignment of things and the polarization in society these days, particularly as this gets expressed even today in what amounts to a counterinsurgency, on the part of the powers-that-be, directed against basic masses, when there is not yet an insurgency among those masses. Even once things were well into the protracted struggle, the people waging that struggle, on the revolutionary side, would still have been coming out of a situation in which there had been, for a long time, an unfavorable polarization; and there would be a need to be constantly working to repolarize things, on more favorable terms, in the course of that protracted struggle. But this is already being acutely posed, as a result particularly of the currently one-sided nature of what I have referred to (and some others, coming from different viewpoints, have also spoken to this in similar terms) as a counterinsurgency directed against basic masses when there is not yet an insurgency among them, and more generally the unfavorable character of the current political/ideological alignment in society overall, including among the middle strata.
In terms of this counterinsurgency toward basic masses, even when there is not yet an insurgency among them, we can think of things like the "war on drugs," mass incarceration, "stop and frisk" and the entering into "law enforcement databases" of millions and millions of youth in the inner cities, including many in situations where they have committed no crime. What is the purpose, strategically speaking, of the ruling class in doing all this? They are not just doing it to "keep order" in the present circumstances but, at least on the part of some more strategic thinkers, they are doing it with the future in mind—in an effort to preempt the possibility of a real insurgency, and to be in a position to immediately and ruthlessly crush it if, despite all their efforts, one occurs in any case.
Now, with regard to the presently unfavorable polarization among the middle strata, there is the work that has been done on the part of the ruling class, in terms of the way it has carried out propaganda in various forms (including through its mass media and "popular culture") dehumanizing the basic masses, portraying them as debased and dangerous. It is very troubling to have to say it, but we have to realize that broadly among the middle strata there is an acceptance, to way too great a degree, of this view of the basic masses, and the youth in particular in the inner cities, that is purveyed by the ruling class. If that were not the case, even with all the self-indulgent individualism that's so rampant in the culture these days, there would be much more massive outcry and resistance when something like the egregious murder of Oscar Grant occurs—when, instead, there is silence and inactivity, not literally but to far too great a degree, particularly among the middle strata, and especially among white people.
And this, of course, relates to the point that was being emphasized earlier about "breaking out of the encirclement" when the conditions are qualitatively different, and the protracted struggle for power is being waged—not allowing things to settle into terms where only the most bedrock base for the revolutionary struggle would be in a position of support and active involvement—which would also mean that, before long, even that base could not hold out. Mao made this point (I believe it was in "A Single Spark Can Start A Prairie Fire"), speaking about the situation in what were the early stages of the protracted people's war in China, where the revolutionary forces had established base areas in the countryside: if they weren't able to expand the territory of the base areas and involve more people in this, Mao warned, then first of all, the middle strata in the base areas—the better-off peasants, as well as artisanal and other middle strata—would desert them, and then even the basic masses, the poor and lower-middle peasants and the proletarians, would not be able to hold out. There is an analogy between that and the situation and problems that would have to be confronted in terms of the kind of protracted revolutionary struggle in imperialist countries that is spoken to in "On the Possibility of Revolution."
Once again, all this points to and underlines the importance, even now, of repolarization—with the strategic orientation of building a movement for revolution—political and ideological repolarization, now and in an ongoing way.
So those are some points that are worth calling attention to in regard to what is put forth in "On the Possibility of Revolution," speaking specifically of imperialist countries.
1. "On the Possibility of Revolution," which first appeared in Revolution #102, September 23, 2007, is also included in Revolution and Communism: A Foundation and Strategic Orientation, a Revolution pamphlet, May 1, 2008, and is available online at revcom.us. [back]